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ABSTRACT
This paper provides two counter-examples to the widely-held view
that valuation effects do not add to instability under rational
expectations. It is shown first that given certain parameter values,
the creditor country's equilibrium is stable with static expectations
and is a saddle-point with rational expectations, the debtor country's
equilibrium could be completely unstable with static and rational expec-
tations. Second a creditor country could be stable under static expec-
tations but completely unstable under rational expectations while the
opposite is true for a debtor country.
Key-words: Debtor Country, Creditor Country, Valuation Effects,
Rational Expectations, Saddle-Point

I. INTRODUCTION
Practitioners of open-economy macroeconomics have for long been
worried about the implications of a net debtor country. There was a
belief that the model of a small open economy which is a net debtor
would be characterized by dynamic instability (see e.g. , Branson,
Halttunen and Masson (1979), Boyer (1977) and Enders (1977)). 1
This was before the advent of rational expectations. With
rational expectations or perfect foresight, several authors (see,
Branson and Henderson (1985), Kouri (1983), Henderson and Rogoff
(1982)) showed that the long-run equilibrium was always a saddle point
and therefore as long as the economy jumped to the stable arm follow-
ing an unanticipated immediately implemented permanent disturbance
2
then instability need not arise.
To be a little more precise the proposition could be recast as
follows: Two economies which are identical in every respect, except
their foreign asset positions would have similar dynamics under
rational expectations. If the net creditor country has a well-behaved
dynamics (i.e., the long-run equilibrium is a saddle point) then so
would it be for a net debtor country—merely because of a negative net
foreign asset position we should not expect to observe a different pat-
3tern of behavior (i.e., instability).
In this paper we show by means of two counter-examples that this
proposition is generally not true. In the first model below, for
the assumed parameter values, under static expectations the creditor
country always possesses a stable long run equilibrium whereas the
-2-
debtor country does not. Under rational expectations, given the
parameter values, the creditor country's long run equilibrium is a
saddle-point whereas the debtor's country's long run equilibrium is
completely unstable.
In the second example, it is shown that with static expectations
and given parameter values, the creditor country has a stable long run
equilibrium but the debtor country does not. However, when the expec-
tations are rational, it turns out that the debtor country has a
saddle-point long-run equilibrium whereas the creditor country's long-
run equilibrium is completely unstable again for the given parameter
values.
The upshot of all this is that rationality of expectations does not
always make an unstable equilibrium when expectations are static stable
and vice-versa. The first example shows that there are (not very
implausible) parameter values for which even with perfect foresight the
debtor country's run equilibrium remains unstable. In the second ex-
ample it is shown while rational expectations certainly makes the debtor
country's long-run equilibrium a saddle-point, whereas it was completely
unstable under static expectations. It is the creditor country's long-
run equilibrium (which was stable under state expectations), now beco-
mes completely unstable given the parameter values.
Before proceeding, it should be pointed out that most of the para-
meter values below are not wildly unrealistic. Since it is our wish to
provide counterexamples rather than prove general results these seem
adequate.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the
first model is presented and examined. In the next section, we analyze
the second model—it is actually a slightly altered version of the
model in Section 2. Finally Section 4 contains some concluding comments
,
2. EXAMPLE 1
The model is an open economy version of a IS-LM-Phillips curve
model. Agents have rational expectations. The goods demand function
has wealth as an argument, so there is also a wealth accumulation
equation.
The economy produces a good which is an imperfect substitute for
the imported good which is produced abroad. It takes all foreign
variables as given. For simplicity it is assumed all bonds are denom-
inated in the foreign currency. We shall also ignore interest pay-
ments on these bonds so that no distinction is made between the trade
balance and the current account.
The model is given below. (All variables except interest rates
are in logarithms, a dot over a variable denotes a time derivative and
all coefficients are positive.)
M - Q « -<x i + a Y (1)
i = i* + E (2)
Y = B
1
(E-P) + 8
2
W (3)
P = tt(Y-Y) + E (4)
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Either W = fE + fF + (l-f)M - Q (5a)
or W = -gE - gD + (l+g)M - Q (5b)
Q = 6P + (1-6)E (6)
Either F - Yj(E-P) - y
^
(7a)
or D = -y (E-P) + Y
2
W (7b)
where M is the nominal stock of money (assumed to be constant), E the
nominal exchange rate expressed as the domestic currency price of
foreign exchange, P the price of the domestic good in domestic
currency, i the domestic nominal interest rate, i* the foreign nominal
(and real) interest rate, Y is the level of domestic output ((Y) is its
fixed long-run level), W is real domestic wealth, F the domestic
holding of foreign assets, D the domestic debt (in foreign currency),
f(g) the share of the foreign asset (debt) in domestic wealth and Q the
price index (the domestic CPI).
Equation (1) is the asset markets equilibrium condition. The real
money supply (in terms of the consumption basket) must equal the demand
for it. The demand falls as the nominal interest rate rises and rises
as output (the transactions proxy) rises.
Equation (2) links the domestic nominal interest rate to the
foreign interest rate via the uncovered interest parity condition,
i.e., the difference between the former and the latter is the expected
rate of depreciation of the domestic currency.
Equation (3) is the domestic goods market equilibrium condition.
Output Y is demand-determined in the short run. Demand for domestic
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output depends on wealth and the terms of trade. A rise in wealth
raises demand as does a worsening of the terms of trade (a rise in
(E-P), the foreign currency price of the foreign good is constant and
its logarithim is zero) switching demand towards domestic goods
—
implicitly we are assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition is
satisfied.
Equation (4) is the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. It can
be derived from a wage-Phillips curve and mark-up pricing where the
expected increase in the cost-of-living enters with a unit coefficient
and agents possess perfect foresight. (See Turnovsky (1981) for simi-
4
lar specification.)
Equations (5a) and (5b) define wealth for the creditor and the deb-
tor country respectively. It is assumed that for the latter also
wealth is positive. The deflator is the cost of living index (defined
in (6) below).
The price index in equation (6) is a weighted average (5 being the
share of the domestic good) of the price of the domestic and foreign
good.
Equation (7a) and (7b) give the current account equations for the
creditor and debtor country respectively. The current account improves
with a real depreciation and worsens with a rise in wealth (because
this raises domestic absorption).
Suppose the relevant parameter values are as follows:
a
l
= 0.5 a
2
= 0.2 tt = 1 f = 0.7
6 = 0.9 B. - 0.4 6 = 0.7 y = 0.7
Y
2
= 0.3 and g = 0.8
-6-
Now consider the model under static expectations. Here expected E
is always zero. By substituting (1), (2), (3), (5a) and (6) in (4)
and (7a) we obtain the dynamics of the creditor country in terms of two
differential equation in P and F as shown in Appendix 1.
The trace of the coefficient matrix is
-{Tr(B
1
+6
2
f6) +Y
1
a
2
B
2
f + T
2
f(a
2
B
1
+ (l-5))}/{a
2
(6
1
+B
2
(f-(l-6))) + (1-6)]
and the determinant is
fn(B
1
Y
2
+Y
1
3
2
)/{a
2
(B
1
-HJ
2
(f-(l-6))) + (1-6)}.
A sufficient condition for the trace to be negative and the
determinant to be positive is that f-(l-5) > 0, and this is satisified
for our assumed parameter values. Therefore, under static expectation
the creditor country's long-run equilibrium is stable.
For the debtor country under static expectations, we substitute
(1), (2), (3), (5b) and (6) in (4) and (7b) to obtain two differential
equation in P and D. The determinant of the coefficients matrix is
TTg(8
1
Y
2
+Y
1
B
2
)/{a
2
(B
1
-B
2
(g+(l-6))) + (1-6)}
which is positive if the term in the denominator is positive (the term
gives the effect of a depreciation on money demand). For our parameter
values it is positive (=.05) so the determinant is positive.
The trace of this matrix is
-{irCB j+3
2
K5 > + g(Y
1
B
2
a
2
-Y
2
a
2
B
1
-Y
2
(l-6))}/{a
2
(8
1
-B
2
(g+(l-6))) + (1-6)}.
Evaluating this expression for the parameter values above, we get
1.6 > 0. Since both the trace and the determinant are positive, the
model under static expectations is completely unstable.
With rational expectations, we get a third order dynamic system
for the creditor country by substituting (1), (3), (5a) and (6) in
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(2), (4) and (7a) (in E, P and F). This can be written compactly as
follows.
E E
P = A P
_F_ _F_
(8)
where A is the coefficients matrix (the value of the elements of A,
i.e., the a..'s are given in Appendix 2).
The determinant of A is given by
= TTf(6
l
Y
2
"H3
2
Y
l
)/a
1
> (9)
which implies that there are either two stable roots (i.e., roots with
negative real parts) and one unstable root, or three unstable roots.
For our model to possess a sensible solution we require that there be
two stable roots ("corresponding to" the two backward looking variables
P and F) and one unstable root ("associated with" the forward-looking
variable E).
A sufficient condition for ruling out the complete instability
case is that the sum of the product of two roots at a time
X
1
X
2
+ X
2
X
3
+ X
3
X
1
=
-7TCt
1
~
1
(B
1
+B
2
f6) + T
2
f(B
1
TT-a
l
"
1
) + Y^B^ (10)
be negative (X.'s are the roots of A). This expression is equal to
-1.675 for the given parameter values.
Therefore the long-run equilibrium for the creditor country under
rational expectations is a saddle-point.
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Turning to the debtor country first recall that we had instability
with static expectations with the values of the parameters given above.
With perfect foresight we can express the dynamics of the debtor
country in terms of a system of three differential equations by sub-
stituting (1), (3), (5b) and (6) in (2), (4) and (7b)
•
E E
•
P = B P
D D
(11)
the values of b 's are given in Appendix 2. The determinant of B is
i.i
*g(B Y +8 Y )/a > (12)
So as for the creditor country there are either three unstable
roots or one unstable root and two stable roots.
The trace of B is given by
-o
2
B
2
(l+g)/a
1
- iKB^B^) - Y
2
g + l/o
1
(13)
For the parameter values given above this is equal to 0.23.
The sum of the product of the roots two at a time is given by
= Y
2
g(7TB
l
^t
1
) + TrB
2
gT
1
~ n(S
1
-S
2
g6)a
1
(14)
which given our parameter values is equal to 0.21. Since the values of
all the three equations (12), (13) and (14) turn out to be positive, B
possesses no stable root. The long-run equilibrium is completely
unstable in spite of the fact that we have two sluggishly evolving
variables—P and D.
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In this section we saw that in our model given the parameter
values, the creditor country is stable both under static and rational
expectations, whereas the debtor country is unstable under both kinds
of expectations formation. The Branson-Henderson assertion is there-
fore not true here.
3- EXAMPL_E__2_
The only difference between the model of the last section and this
one is that here the money demand function depends on real wealth.
This has interesting implications for the problem at hand.
Replace equation (1) by
M-Q = -a i + a Y +a W 1-a (1+f) > (15)
1-a (1+g) >
Consider two economies with the following parameter values
a = .5 a~ = . 1 a~ = .6
$
l
= 1 B
2
= .8 TT = 1
Yj = 4-3 6 Y
2
= .2 5 = .5
f = .7 g = .6
First before turning to an analysis of the dynamics of the models,
note that both the restrictions in equation (15) are satisfied and
hence, an increase in M creates excess supply in the money market
directly. The indirect effect on the money market operates through the
goods market and its effect on E and Y (recall the undershooting case
in Dornbusch (1976)).
As before, we express the dynamics of the creditor country under
static expectations in terms of P and F. The trace of the coefficient
matrix is
-10-
ir{-6
1
(l-<x
3
(l-f)) - Yj(a
2
B
2
f-Hx
3
f) - Y £ (
fc^B
{
+ f ( 1 -6 ) )} /A
{
and the determinant = tt f{ y B ~+Y ?B } /A
where Aj = a
2
(B j-HJ^f-U-S ))) + a
3
(f-(l-6)) + (1-5).
The trace is negative and the determinant positive if f
—
( 1 —6 ) > 0,
which is true for our parameter values so under static expectations,
the creditor country is stable.
When expectations are rational, we can reduce the dynamics of the
creditor country to a third-order system in E, P and F as in the last
section (using (15) instead of (1)).
= C (16)
the elements of the C matrix are given in Appendix 2.
The determinant of C is
f*(B
1
Y
2
+T
1
B
2
)/ct
1
> (17)
so as for matrices A and B in the previous section either there are
three unstable roots or one.
The trace of C is
a
3
fa
1
l
- nCBj+e^) - o
2
B
2
(l-f)o
1
!
- Yjf + (l-a^ l (18)
and the sum of the product of two roots at a time is
-fir(l-o
3
)(66
2
+6
1
f
l
) - a
3
f(6
1
+6
2
6)a
1
L
- y^ X + firCB^+Y^) (19)
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For For C to possess three unstable roots we require both equation
(18) and (19) to be positive (the determinant is unambiguously positive)
With the parameter values given above the trace of C is equal to
.05 and equation (19) is equal to .07.
The creditor country which was unambiguously stable under static
expectations fails to possess a saddle-point equilibrium under perfect
foresight and the given parameter values.
Turning to the debtor country and proceeding as in the previous
section we can reduce the dynamics with static expectations to a
second order system in P and D. After doing so the trace of the coef-
ficient matrix is found to be
{ 1r(-6 1+e i (l+g)o 34fi 2g6)
- Yl (ct 26 2
g+ga
3
) - Y
2
(gO-<5)+a
2
8
1
)}/A
2
(20)
where &
2
= (1-6) + a fl -0 2 (g+( 1-5 ) ) )
- a
3
(g+(l-5)).
For the parameter values above, this expression has a value of 1.04,
implying that at least one of the roots of the coefficient matrix is
positive and the system is unstable.
Turning to the case of rational expectation we can reduce the deb-
tor country's dynamics to a system of three differential equation in
E, P and D
= H (21)
The values of h..'s are also given in Appendix 2.
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The determinant of H is
gTT(6
1
Y
2
-^
2
Y
1
)a
1
~ 1
> (22)
again implying that either there are no stable roots or two stable
roots
.
The trace of H is
(l-^x
3
)a
1
"
1
-{tt(B
1
+S
2
«) + Y
2
g + (a
2
B
2
(l+g) + c^g)/^} (23)
which is negative for our assumed parameter values (=-1.7) which
implies that at least one root must be stable but then we know (from
equation (22)) that then two roots are negative (or have negative real
parts)
.
The debtor country which was unstable with static expectations for
the given parameter values turns out to be well behaved, i.e.,
possessing a saddle-point under perfect foresight.
In this section we examined a model where the creditor country
goes from being stable under static expectations to completely
unstable under perfect foresight. The opposite is true for the debtor
country.
4 . CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have re-examined the dynamic stability of two
economies indentical in every respect but in their net foreign asset
position. It was found that the conventional wisdom--that debtor
countries which are unstable under static expectations become
(saddle-point) stable under perfect foresight—is not generally true.
-13-
A corollary that the creditor country's dynamics is always more stable
—
i.e. , instability is usually associated with a debtor country—was also
shown to be untrue in general.
In our first example a debtor country remains unstable under per-
fect foresight. In the second example the debtor country's equilibrium
indeed becomes a saddle-point but the creditor country goes from being
completely stable to completely unstable.
-14-
Footnotes
A more complete list of references is to be found in Branson and
Henderson (1985).
2
Two quotations will give a flavor of the conclusions reached in
the literature:
No matter whether goods prices are fixed or flexible
under rational expectations, instability ... (can)
not (arise) because of perverse valuation effects
associated with negative net foreign asset positions.
(Branson and Henderson (1985), p. 782.)
...(W)hen expectations are rational the problem of
nonexistence of short-run equilibrium does not arise
provided that long-term equilibrium is unique.
(Kouri (1983), p. 154.)
3
"... (N)egative net foreign asset positions are not an indepen-
dent source of instability. Instability can arise only under non-
rational expectations" (Branson and Henderson (1985), p. 777).
4
Consider first a wage-Phillips curve.
V = j(Y-Y) + Q
where V is the log of the money wage rate and Q, the expected (percen-
tage) increase in the cost of living. If prices are a (fixed) mark-up
on money wages then
P = j(Y-Y) + Q.
Using the definition of Q, (4) follows where tt = j/(l-5).
Note the E term in (4) is the expected rate of depreciation. We
have
E(t) = E (t,t) + E (t,t) where E (t,t) = lira e [ (E( t+h)-E( t) )/I( t ) ] /h
2 h+0
h>0
and E (t,t) = lim e [E( t+h) /I( t+h)-E( t+h)/ I( t
)
h+0
h>0
where we have assumed E(t,t) = E(t). e is the expectations operator
and I(x), the information set at t.
When new information arrives it is E^Ct.t) (the revision in expec-
tations) which jumps and Ei(t,t) remains finite. Only with this inter-
pretation of E is it possible to maintain that P is not a forward-looking
jump variable.
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When this condition holds with equality, i.e., f = (1-6), the
country is insulated from a once-and-for-all change in the rest of
the world's price level.
The responsiveness of the trade balance to the real exchange rate
is high here but this just implies that the domestic and foreign goods
are close substitute. Perfect substitutability, i.e., purchasing power
parity implies y +• «°.
-16-
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Appendix 1
Here we outline a method for analyzing the stability of a model
under, static expectations. We use the creditor country's model in
Section 2.
Putting E = and substituting for W and P in the money market
equilibrium, we get
E = E(P,F), (A.l)
E = {5 - a„(8 +B <5)}/S, Ep = a.B.f/S
p lil F Z 2.
where S = (1-6) + a (8
t
+B (f-( 1-6 )) ).
Then substituting for W in equations (4) and (7a), we have
P = tt[B.(E -1) + B,(f-(1-6)E -6)] P + TTtB.E^, + 8.((f-(l-6))E +f)]F (A. 2)lp2 p 1F2 F
and
F = [v(E -1) - Y ((f-(1-6))E -6)]P + y [? - Y (f"( 1-6) )E +f ) ]F. (A. 3)
1 p 2 p 1 F 2 F
(A. 2) and (A. 3) constitute the second order dynamic system under static
expectat ions.
The values of E and E (or E ) differ between models in sections 2
p F D
and 3. For the debtor country the relevant dynamic variables are P and
D.
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